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Be not the first by whom
the new are tried,
Yet not the last to lay
the old aside."
I. INTRODUCTION
Forty years have passed since Judge Traynor in Bernhard v.
Bank of America2 ignored Alexander Pope's advice by signaling
the willingness of the American judicial system to change its con-
ception of the proper scope of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Prior to the Bernhard decision, collateral estoppel, or issue preclu-
sion,s operated only to bind mutual parties: a party could invoke
the benefits of a prior judgment to preclude an opponent in subse-
quent litigation only if the judgment would have bound that party
had the court decided the prior suit the opposite way.4 In Bern-
hard Judge Traynor "extirpate[d] the mutuality requirement and
put it to the torch,' '5 replacing it with a condition that only "the
party against whom the plea [of collateral estoppel] is asserted"
need be a party or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication.'
A majority of federal7 and state' courts have accepted Judge
1. A. PoPs, AN ESSAY ON CRITICISM Pt. II, 1, 133 (1709).
2. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
3. "Issue preclusion" is Professor Vestal's terminology for the effect of collateral es-
toppel, since it precludes relitigation of identical issues in subsequent actions for separate
claims. He distinguishes it from claim preclusion, traditionally termed res judicata, which
precludes relitigation of the same claim or cause of action once a court has rendered a judg-
ment on it. See Vestal, Rationale of Preclusion, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 29, 30 (1964); see gener-
ally infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 64-84 and accompanying text.
5. Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CAnrF. L. Rav. 25, 26 (1965).
6. Bernhard v. Bank of Am., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 813, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (1942).
7. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Blonder-Tongue
Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
8. See, e.g., Pennington v. Snow, 471 P.2d 370 (Alaska 1970); Standage Ventures, Inc.
v. State, 114 Ariz. 480, 562 P.2d 360 (1977); Bernhard v. Bank of Am., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122
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Traynor's modification, which allows a stranger to a prior action to
preclude a party to that action from relitigating an issue he liti-
gated previously and lost. Nevertheless, the mutuality requirement
is not without its vocal supporters, and the so-called Bernhard
doctrine still enjoys less than universal acceptance by both state
courts9 and commentators.10 The overall trend, however, has been
toward steady abandonment of the mutuality requirement. Al-
though many scholars have objected to the Bernhard doctrine"
and some courts have resisted its adoption, 2 the requirement inev-
itably will become the "dead letter" that one court already has la-
belled it.'
In this process the mutuality requirement mirrors many other
once viable judicial principles that the legal community long ac-
P.2d 892 (1942); Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 183 Colo. 344, 517 P.2d 396 (1973); Morneau v. Stark
Enter., 56 Hawaii 420, 539 P.2d 472 (1975); Illinois State Chamber of Commerce v. Pollution
Control Bd., 78 Ill. 2d 1, 398 N.E.2d 9 (1979); Schneberger v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., 213 N.W.2d 913 (Iowa 1973); Hossler v. Barry, 403 A.2d 762 (Me. 1979); Pat
Perusse Realty Co. v. Lingo, 249 Md. 33, 238 A.2d 100 (1968); Home Owners Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Northwestern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 354 Mass. 448, 238 N.E.2d 55 (1968);
Lustic v. Rankila, 269 Minn. 515, 131 N.W.2d 741 (1964); Gerhardt v. Miller, 532 S.W.2d
852 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Peterson v. Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 204 Neb. 136, 281 N.W.2d
525 (1979); Paradise Palms Community Ass'n v. Paradise Homes, 89 Nev. 27, 505 P.2d 596
(1973); Sanderson v. Balfour, 109 N.H. 213, 247 A.2d 185 (1968); Desmond v. Kramer, 96
N.J. Super. 96, 232 A.2d 470 (1967); Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97,
151 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956); Anco Mfg. & Supply Co. v. Swank, 524 P.2d 7 (Okla. 1974); Bahler v.
Fletcher, 474 P.2d 329 (Or. 1970); Melbourn v. Benham, 292 N.W.2d 335 (S.D. 1980); Sam-
ple v. Chapman, 7 Wash. App. 129, 497 P.2d 1334 (1972); Moore v. Sun Lumber Co., 276
S.E.2d 797 (W. Va. 1981); McCourt v. Algiers, 4 Wis. 2d 607, 91 N.W.2d 194 (1958).
9. See, e.g., Russell v. Russell, 404 So. 2d 662 (Ala. 1981); Daigneau v. National Cash
Register Co., 247 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1971); Smith v. Wood, 115 Ga. App. 265, 154 S.E.2d 646
(1967); State v. Speidel, 392 N.E.2d 1172 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Keith v. Schiefen-Stockham
Ins. Agency, Inc., 209 Kan. 537, 498 P.2d 265 (1972); Stillpass v. Kenton County Airport
Bd., 403 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1966); Trahan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 303 So. 2d 606 (La. Ct. App.
1974); Howell v. Vito's Trucking and Excavating Co., 386 Mich. 37, 191 N.W.2d 313 (1971);
National Mortgage Corp. v. American Title Ins. Co., 299 N.C. 369, 261 S.E.2d 844 (1980);
Armstrong v. Miller, 200 N.W.2d 282 (N.D. 1972); Whitehead v. General Tel. Co., 20 Ohio
St. 2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10 (1969); Cole v. Arnold, 545 S.W.2d 95 (Tenn. 1977); Atchley v.
Superior Oil Co., 482 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Bailey Lumber
Co., 221 Va. 638, 272 S.E.2d 217 (1980).
10. See, e.g., 1B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE I 0.412[1] (2d ed. 1982); Greenebaum,
In Defense of the Doctrine of Mutuality of Estoppel, 45 IND. L.J. 1 (1969); Overton, The
Restatement of Judgments, Collateral Estoppel, and Conflict of Laws, 44 TENN. L. REV.
927 (1977); Note, A Probabilistic Analysis of the Doctrine of Mutuality of Collateral Estop-
pel, 76 MICH. L. REv. 612 (1978).
11. See supra authorities cited note 10.
12. See supra authorities cited note 9.
13. See B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 147, 225 N.E.2d 195, 198, 278




cepted, then gradually challenged, and eventually discarded in
favor of other rules that-at least arguably-more effectively serve
desired policy goals. Tradition, judicial conservatism, and the iner-
tia of long-established precedent combine to guarantee that each
overthrow is a lengthy and intricate matter. The entire legal sys-
tem must reorient and reeducate itself: what once was truth is now
error. This process occurs more smoothly if the changes are per-
ceived not as a break with tradition but as a logical progression
based on an underlying continuity of principles.
Most commentators on the Bernhard doctrine, both pro and
con, have viewed it as a radical departure from settled collateral
estoppel application, "putting to the torch," to use Professor Cur-
rie's metaphor, traditional principles and replacing them with an
untested and arguably dangerous doctrine. Opponents have raised
a parade of horribles that they contend will result from aban-
doning the mutuality requirement. This Note adopts a more mod-
erate position: the Bernhard doctrine is but a minor alteration of
collateral estoppel principles. It has not and will not generate the
unfairness and injustice that its critics have predicted. After trac-
ing the development of the principle of collateral estoppel from its
origins in early English common law, this Note discusses some sug-
gested justifications for the mutuality requirement and some gen-
erally accepted exceptions to its use. It then examines the growth
of the Bernhard doctrine and compares how the courts have ap-
plied both the mutuality requirement and the Bernhard doctrine.
Finally, the Note seeks to determine whether the dangers voiced
by the Bernhard critics actually have materialized. The Note con-
cludes that abandonment of the mutuality requirement has af-
fected minimally the results of recent collateral estoppel cases. Its
most obvious effect has been to shift the burden of proof in
nonmutuality cases away from the party asserting preclusion-who
no longer bears the burden of proving the applicability of some
exception to the Bernhard doctrine-onto the party precluded, to
show that the issue was not litigated adequately in the prior suit.
This shift better serves the policy goals of collateral estoppel to
put an end to litigation and to utilize most efficiently the resources
of the judicial system.
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
A. The Policy Basis for Collateral Estoppel
As a legal principle collateral estoppel promotes finality of de-
14251982]
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cision," which benefits the legal system in several ways. First, liti-
gation must reach an end for the results to be meaningful. Without
some finality principle the losing party would be free to retry law-
suits continually in the hope of eventually obtaining a more
favorable decision. A principle of preclusion prevents the harass-
ment that results from these repetitious suits.15 Second, preclusion
promotes public confidence in the legal system"6 and permits inter-
ested parties to predict and plan future affairs17 based on the re-
sults obtained in a prior lawsuit. Knowing that subsequent litiga-
tion will not supersede these results, litigants may depend upon
the rights and liabilities established previously in planning their
future financial needs or business decisions. Nonparties also may
depend upon the precedential value of the suit to assist them in
charting a future course of action."" Last, precluding relitigation
promotes judicial economy19 by eliminating the need for allocating
judicial time and expense to duplicate the efforts made in an ear-
lier suit. This duplication is of particular concern in light of the
heavy docket backlog that courts presently face. Preclusion con-
serves judicial resources by narrowing the areas of conflict in a law-
suit through elimination from further contention of those issues
14. See, e.g., Taylor v. Sartorious, 130 Mo. App. 23, 40, 108 S.W. 1089, 1094 (1908)
(application of collateral estoppel depends upon "the policy of law to end litigation by
preventing a party who has had one fair trial of a question of fact, from again drawing it
into controversy").
15. See, e.g., Bernhard v. Bank of Am., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 811, 122 P.2d 892, 894 (1942);
Vestal, supra note 3, at 31, 34. Some commentators have noted that this harassment ratio-
nale is not relevant to the debate since a stranger to the prior suit who has not litigated
previously is the one attempting to prevent multiple suits; the party who lost in the prior
action has no objection to relitigation. See, e.g., Overton, supra note 10, at 934. Neverthe-
less, noting a "reason to be concerned" over the losing party's choice, the United States
Supreme Court has contended that relitigation constitutes an "arguable misallocation of
resources," since it diverts time and money from alternative uses in favor of a dispute over
an already-decided issue. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S.
313, 329 (1971).
16. See, e.g., Vestal, supra note 3, at 31, 33-34.
17. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948); Callen & Kadue, To
Bury Mutuality, Not to Praise It: An Analysis of Collateral Estoppel After Parklane Ho-
siery v. Shore, 31 HAST. L.J. 755, 763-64 (1980).
18.
[Flinality allows the parties to plan their conduct outside the judicial forum, whether
by allowing them to use resources for purposes other than judicial battle, by encourag-
ing them to behave in ways approved by the prior decision, by discouraging them from
behaving in a manner they know to be illegal, or by preventing the estopped party from
using the threat of relitigation to extract concessions from a person who was not a
party to the prior action.
Callen & Kadue, supra, at 763-64.
19. See, e.g., Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 953 (2d Cir. 1964).
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that the courts already have decided.20
B. Development of the Doctrine
Although commentators often classify the modern doctrine of
collateral estoppel as a branch of-or at least as derived from-the
principle of res judicata, 1 these two principles of English common
law had different origins.2 Common to both these notions is the
concept of preclusion: the inability, in a later suit, to relitigate the
result reached in a prior suit. In res judicata this preclusive effect
depends upon the judgment previously reached and includes both
merger-which joins into the judgment all claims that the prior
suit could have litigated-and bar-which extinguishes the claim
or cause of action, leaving only the judgment, and thus prevents
later litigation of the claim by the losing party.2' This notion that a
judgment has an independent preclusive effect is characteristic of
the Roman law.2
4
The principle of collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of
factual issues that a court decided in a prior suit.'5 The preclusive
effect depends not upon the judgment itself but upon the actual
determination of issues during the course of the prior litigation;
the judgment simply ensures the finality of the issue resolution.'
This principle stems not from the Norman introduction of Roman
law into Britain, but from the Germanic influence on pre-Conquest
Saxon law. 7
Early Germanic law contained no concept of res judicata-the
preclusive effect of a prior adverse judgment on a later claim.28 Un-
20. See Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 IowA L. REv.
217, 220 (1954).
21. See, e.g., Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doc-
trine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281, 281 n.1 (1957); von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299,
300-01 (1928); Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estop-
pel by a Nonparty, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1010, 1012 (1967).
22. Res judicata originates from Roman law, while collateral estoppel stems from the
Germanic law system. Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res Judi-
cata, 35 ILL. L. REv. 41, 41 (1940). See infra notes 27-51 and accompanying text.
23. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.3 (1977).
24. See Millar, supra note 22, at 42.
25. F. JAMES & G. HAzARD, supra note 23, § 11.16.
26. Although courts and commentators commonly refer to the modern doctrine as es-
toppel by judgment, see, e.g., Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1942), the original principle operated irrespective of a final judgment in the first action.
Millar, supra note 22, at 53-56. See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
27. Millar, supra note 22, at 44.
28. Millar, supra note 22, at 42 (translating Seelman, Der Rechtszug im 1lteren deut-
schen Recht, 107 GIERKES UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR DEUTSCHEN STAATS-UND RECHTSGES-
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less the parties themselves agreed otherwise, the law permitted a
subsequent action and a new judgment.2 9 Nevertheless, the system
possessed some principle of finality in that the facts themselves, as
the earlier suit determined them, retained significance:
In case of a renewed controversy as to the same matter it was not the
judgment in the former proceeding that the previously successful party in-
voked, but the state of things [Sachverhalt] established in the former contro-
versy. Not the fact that a judgment has been rendered, that an earlier court
has made this or that pronouncement, . . . but the fact that ... [w]hat a
party in due form has admitted, what witnesses have declared, what members
of an inquest have pronounced, what the parties have sworn, these retain
significance for all time to come.30
Thus, the parties' own acts and statements antecedent to judgment
precluded them from alleging the contrary in a subsequent
action.$'
Incorporated into the English common law as estoppel by re-
cord, this principle remained distinct from res judicata both con-
ceptually and as applied. For example, in Outram v. Morewood3
2
plaintiff sued a husband and wife in trespass for mining coal on
property that plaintiff claimed he owned. Defendants entered a
plea averring that the wife had obtained the land in question by
devise from her first husband. 3 Plaintiff then in replication pled
estoppel by record based on a prior suit which had determined
that the land devised to the wife did not include the coal mine.4
Permitting the estoppel plea, Lord Ellenborough noted that
[i]t is not the recovery, but the matter alleged by the party, and upon which
the recovery proceeds, which creates the estoppel. The recovery of itself in an
action of trespass is only a bar to the future recovery of damages for the same
injury; but the estoppel precludes parties and privies from contending to the
contrary of that point, or matter of fact, which having once been distinctly
put in issue by them .... has been, on such issue joined, solemnly found
against them.",
In many cases the procedural application of either bar or es-
toppel yielded the same substantive effect-the preclusion of reliti-
gation by a losing party,36 and perhaps for that reason, the com-
CHICHTE 90, 198 (1911)).
29. Id. (quoting Seelman, supra note 28, at 103).
30. Id. (quoting Seelman, supra note 28, at 198-99).
31. Millar, supra note 22, at 44.
32. 102 Eng. Rep. 630 (1803).
33. Id. at 631.
34. Id. at 632-33.
35. Id. at 633.
36. See, e.g., Kempton and Coopers Case, 74 Eng. Rep. 285 (1589). Millar, supra note
22, at 52 n.53 & authorities cited therein.
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mon-law courts did not always recognize the distinction between
the two principles. 7 Despite the similar application of bar and es-
toppel, the basis for the preclusion by estoppel, as Professor Millar
points out, "was not the judgment qua judgment... but.., the
process, . . . the pleadings and verdict, as authenticated by the
judgment, and by virtue not of res judicata but of the restraint
upon contradiction of the previous record involved in the idea of
estoppel. 3' Thus, estoppel by record developed from the same
principles as the more recent doctrines of estoppel by deed and
estoppel in pais.39 All three principles contain a recognition "that
by [actions and assertions] in the previous cause the party had cre-
ated or participated in creating a condition from which the law
would not suffer him to recede. '40
The initial clarity of the estoppel by record principle faded
under long exposure to the res judicata doctrine of Roman law,
which modified the Germanic concept in two ways. First, although
in its early application to matters of record this estoppel required
no final judgment,41 by the time of Coke in the seventeenth cen-
tury matters that the complaint alleged worked an estoppel only
after a judgment,42 not after a nonsuit. This modification signaled
not an adoption of the Roman preclusion principle, but merely an
assertion that the "estoppel was inchoate and unenforceable unless
the former proceeding had terminated in the manner prescribed." 3
Nevertheless, the final judgment requirement, combined with the
general tendency on the part of courts and commentators to con-
37. See, e.g., Vanlandingham v. Ryan, 17 IlM. 25, 28 (1855) ("We do not sanction the
technical distinction which makes a former recovery a bar only when pleaded as an
estoppel.").
38. Millar, supra note 22, at 52.
39. Id. at 53. Estoppel by deed occurs when a grantor who did not have title at the
time of a conveyance subsequently obtains title. The estoppel precludes the grantor from
denying title at the time of the conveyance, and the subsequently-acquired title inures to
the benefit of the grantee. See Denny v. Wilson County, 198 Tenn. 677, 281 S.W.2d 671
(1954). Estoppel in pais, or equitable estoppel, arises from the voluntary conduct of one
party, relied upon by a second party to the second party's detriment. The estoppel pre-
cludes the first party from acting contrary to his original conduct and asserting a right he
otherwise would have had against the second party. See American Bank & Trust Co. v.
Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 251 La. 445, 205 So. 2d 35 (1967).
40. Millar, supra note 22, at 53 (footnote omitted).
41. See Millar, supra note 22, at 54.
42. E. COKE, 2 THE FnRsT PART OF THE INSTTUTES OF THE LAws Or ENGLAND § 352b
(1st Am. ed. 1853) ("matters alleged by way of supposall in counts shall not conclude after
non-suit:- otherwise it is after judgment given..
43. Millar, supra note 22, at 54.
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flate the two types of preclusion," prompted adoption of the loose
terminology of "estoppel by judgment" for the doctrine.4 5
Second, procedural changes in pleading and evidence that
have shifted the acts of identifying and limiting the contested is-
sues from the pleadings to other areas of the litigation process (dis-
covery, for instance) have stripped the record of much of its sub-
stantive content. As the estoppel began to operate more by
evidence extrinsic to the pleadings and less "by record," the need
arose for new terminology. "Estoppel by judgment"-already fa-
miliar-became the generic term for all instances of preclusion,
and thus res judicata subsumed estoppel as one of its branches in
"utter disregard of history." 41 Commentators remained sufficiently
aware of the distinct origins of this branch of preclusion to dub it
"collateral estoppel,' ' 47 but they ignored the historical reasons un-
derlying this designation, other than that the term was intended to
distinguish between the effects of estoppel and res judicata.4 Ap-
parently, as Professor Millar has concluded,
the text-writers have . . . [never considered] the possibility that the word
could have come into employment as something other than an arbitrary des-
ignation of the restraint upon contradiction of the judicial record .... [Ilt
was not the prohibition of record-contradiction, but something behind this,
that is to say, the inability, induced by the act of the party, to recede from a
position taken or a result co-operatively reached in the former proceed-
ing-an inability coming in the dawn of English procedure, to be evidenced
by the inviolable record-that historically lay at the root of the expression.'
The record contradiction rationale is of more than merely histori-
cal significance, for American courts have recognized it on occa-
sion.50 Their failure to do so consistently has resulted in the devel-
44. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
45. Trevivan v. Lawrence, 91 Eng. Rep. 241, 242, (K.B. 1704) (reporter notes that "the
court held that the defendants were estopped by this judgment. .
46. Millar, supra note 22, at 58.
47. Scott, supra note 26, at 3. Austin Scott and Warren Seavy were reporters for the
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS (1942).
48.
It was with some hesitation that we determined to use the term "collateral estoppel."
There is no doubt that the word estoppel is frequently used very loosely. A good deal
may be said for confining it to the situation where a person is precluded from showing
the falsity of a representation made by him upon which another has relied .... It
seemed unwise, however, to invent a new terminology. The use of the word estoppel in
this connection is common. It seemed to us, therefore, that it was best to use it in
bringing out the distinction between the effect of a judgment on the original cause of
action,. . . and its effect upon other causes of action ....
Id. at 3 n.4.
49. Millar, supra note 22, at 58-59.
50. See, e.g., Sly v. Hunt, 159 Mass. 151, 34 N.E. 187 (1893).
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opment of a notion that the judgment itself precludes the parties
to a former suit. This judgment theory is the basis of much of the
current mutuality debate. 1
C. Requirements for Application
The Supreme Court in Cromwell v. County of Sac52 provides
the most authoritative discussion of the requirements for applica-
tion of collateral estoppel principles, as distinct from the res judi-
cata doctrine. Plaintiff in Cromwell brought suit to collect the
principal due on four bonds that the county had issued to con-
struct a new courthouse. In an earlier action to collect interest in-
stallments on the same bonds, the trial court had determined that
the bonds were fraudulent in their inception. On appeal, the Su-
preme Court affirmed the finding of fraud and denied recovery of
the interest installments. The Court based its decision on the ab-
sence of a finding by the trial court that plaintiff was a bona fide
purchaser for value.' 3 In the second suit, for the collection of prin-
cipal, defendant attempted to rely on the Supreme Court's deci-
sion as collateral estoppel, but the Court held that the preclusion
extended only to the fraud issue, and did not apply to any finding
that plaintiff was not a purchaser for value, since "nothing [was]
adjudged in the former action in the finding that the plaintiff had
not made such proof in that case which can preclude the present
plaintiff from making such proof here."" When a party brings a
second suit on a separate claim, "the prior action operates as an
estoppel only as to those matters in issue.. . upon the determina-
tion of which the finding or verdict was rendered." 55 The ambigu-
"A verdict and judgment are conclusive, by way of estoppel, only as to those facts
which were necessarily involved in them, without the existence and proof or admission
of which, such a verdict and judgment could not have been rendered. An estoppel is an
admission or determination under circumstances of such solemnity that the law will
not allow the fact so admitted or established to be afterwards drawn in question ....
When a fact has been once determined in the course of a judicial proceeding, and a
final judgment has been rendered in accordance therewith, it cannot be again litigated
between the same parties without virtually impeaching the correctness of the former
decision, which, from motives of public policy the law does not permit to be done. The
estoppel is not confined to the judgment, but extends to all facts involved in it as
necessary steps or the groundwork upon which it must have been founded."
Id. at 153, 34 N.E. at 188 (quoting Burlen v. Shannon, 99 Mass. 200, 203 (1868)).
51. See infra text accompanying notes 154-59.
52. 94 U.S. 351 (1877).
53. Id. at 359-60.
54. Id. at 360.
55. Id. at 353.
14311982]
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ity of the previous determination" whether the purchaser gave
value for the bonds prevented its preclusive use in the later suit.
Based on this discussion, authorities require four conditions
for the operation of collateral estoppel: identity of issue between
the initial and subsequent suits,57 actual litigation and determina-
tion of the issue in the first suit, 8 necessity of the determination to
the result, 9 and participation in both suits of the parties that the
estoppel benefits and precludes.60 While the parties may disagree
about the existence of each of the first three requirements in a par-
ticular case,"' they have accepted generally the appropriateness of
each condition. Substantial criticism of the final requirement of
mutuality, however, 2 has led to its abandonment in many
jurisdictions.6 s
D. The Mutuality Requirement
Due process requirements limit the application of collateral
estoppel against nonparties to a lawsuit;" the effects of a prior ac-
tion may bind only parties and their privities. 5 The collateral es-
toppel doctrine traditionally has made this limitation mutual: a lit-
igant may not benefit from a prior adjudication unless an opposite
finding by the court also would have bound him. 6 The practical
effect of mutuality is to permit preclusion only when both the
party asserting estoppel in the later suit and his opponent were
56. The absence of a finding that plaintiff had given value for the bonds may have
indicated that he gave no value or that the parties offered no proof on that issue.
57. See, e.g., Dunlap v. Travelers Ins. Co., 223 S.C. 150, 74 S.E.2d 828 (1953). The
issue also must be one of ultimate fact. See Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 930 (2d Cir.
1944); Polasky, supra note 20, at 222-24.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Cathcard, 70 F. Supp. 653 (D. Neb. 1946).
59. See, e.g., Cambria v. Jeffrey, 307 Mass. 49, 29 N.E.2d 555 (1940).
60. This condition also is known as the "mutuality" requirement. See infra notes 64-
84 and accompanying text.
61. For example, both defendant's due care and plaintiff's contributory negligence are
bases for a jury verdict for defendant in a personal injury case. Are both issues (or either)
essential to the judgment? See Halpern v. Schwartz, 426 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1970); see also
Note, Use of Juror Depositions to Bar Collateral Estoppel: A Necessary Safeguard or Dan-
gerous Precedent?, 34 VAND. L. REV. 143, 152-56 (1981).
62. See infra part III.
63. For a listing of the jurisdictions that no longer adhere to this requirement, see
supra note 8.
64. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). "[O]ne is not bound by a judgment... in
which he has not been made a party ... " Id. at 40.
65. Id. at 40.
66. See supra authorities cited note 9.
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parties, or in privity with a party,"7 to the initial action.
Although courts largely have abandoned the requirement of
mutuality in most situations," commentators rely on several policy
rationales to justify its continued use in connection with collateral
estoppel. These justifications fall within the following three catego-
ries: principles of equity and fairness, the nature of an in personam
judgment, and the fallibility of the judicial process.
First, authorities cite the general inequality and unfairness
that would result from the ability of one party to take advantage of
a prior judgment if the judgment would not bind him were it to go
the other way. 9 While few scholars would defend this "windfall"
theory, which is based on the symmetry of general mutuality doc-
trine, many courts continue to apply it.70 Contemporary commen-
tators view the principal focus of this rationale as the unfair alloca-
tion of litigation risks between the bound party, who may incur
multiple liability absent the mutuality requirements, and the bene-
fited party, who risks nothing if the initial suit ends in a result
adverse to him.7 1
Second, several influential commentators have contended that
this limitation on the preclusive effect of prior litigation stems not
from the doctrine of mutuality per se, but from the nature of an in
personam judgment-"from the general principles of our system of
litigation . . . [requiring] that a party to an action . . . risk the
loss of rights or the creation of liabilities only with reference to his
adversaries . . ." That is, a stranger may not benefit from the
results in a prior suit because "the effect of an in personam judg-
ment should extend only to the parties before the court. . . . The
doctrine of mutuality aids in keeping the in personam judgment
67. The classical notion of privity was of a successor in legal interest to a party. More
recently, however, courts have expanded the concept to include any person whose relation-
ship to a party is sufficiently close that the results of the litigation properly may bind him.
See Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
1457, 1459-60 (1968).
68. See, e.g., Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N.Y. 490, 135 N.E. 861 (1922); Ames, Mutuality
in Specific Performance, 3 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1903).
69. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 96 comment a (1942); A. FREEMAN, JUDG-
MENTS § 407, at 889 (5th ed. 1925).
70. See, e.g., Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 238 N.C.
679, 79 S.E.2d 167 (1953). For an early critique of this rationale, see Comment, Privity and
Mutuality in the Doctrine of Res Judicata, 35 YALE L.J. 607 (1926).
71. See Greenebaum, supra note 10; Note, supra note 10 (common party in multiple
suits statistically more likely to suffer greater economic loss if mutuality abandoned).
72. Seavey, Res Judicata with Reference to Persons Neither Parties nor Privi-
ties-Two California Cases, 57 HAnv. L. REv. 98, 105 (1943).
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within such proper bounds .... 7 When mutuality is abandoned,
these commentators contend, permitting the judgment to affect the
rights of a party with respect to a stranger to the original action
violates the in personam principle.
Last, the mutuality requirement limits the preclusive effect of
incorrect determinations. The judicial system is not infallible and
sometimes reaches a result that violates basic notions of truth and
justice. The mutuality rule prevents nonparties from compounding
the mistake and raising the outcome in the initial suit to the status
of objective truth.4 The victim of an aberrational decision should
have the opportunity to relitigate the issue against a nonparty to
the original action in order to reach a more just result.7 5 While sev-
eral reasons support this conclusion, the multiple claimant anom-
aly" is the most widely recognized:"7
An express train speeds through the night. Suddenly, as it enters a curve,
the locomotive leaves the rails, followed by half a dozen tumbling passenger
cars. Fifty passengers are injured. Fifty actions for personal injuries are filed
against the railroad .... A full trial is had [in the first case] on the issue of
the railroad's negligence, and the result is a verdict and judgment for the
plaintiff. The judgment becomes final. What is the status of the forty-nine
remaining actions?
7 8
Without the limitation imposed by mutuality, the outcome of
the first suit precludes the railroad from denying negligence in
each of the remaining actions. Nevertheless, had the railroad won
the negligence issue, that result would not have estopped any of
the other claimants from relitigating-from demanding his own
day in court. The problem becomes more obvious when each of the
first twenty-five claimants loses, and then, for whatever reason, the
twenty-sixth plaintiff wins. Although the results in the initial
twenty-five suits indicate a strong probability that the railroad was
not negligent, absent a mutuality requirement no principle pre-
vents the final twenty-four plaintiffs from riding the preclusive
coattails of this one aberrational verdict.7 9 What rationale justifies
raising the twenty-sixth verdict to an objective truth while ignoring
73. Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TuL. L. Rzv.
301, 301 (1961).
74. See Hornstein v. Kramer Bros. Freight Lines, 133 F.2d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 1943);
Spettigue v. Mahoney, 8 Ariz. App. 281, 286, 445 P.2d 557, 562 (1968).
75. See Moore & Currier, supra note 73, at 310.
76. Currie, supra note 21, coined the term and described the problem it denotes.
77. Greenebaum, supra note 10; Moore & Currier, supra note 73; Overton, supra note
10; Semmel, supra note 67.
78. Currie, supra note 21, at 281.




Another justification for the mutuality requirement that falls
within the third category is the fallibility of the jury system.
Largely uncontrollable factors that influence the outcome of a trial
include jury prejudice, the jury's sympathy for an injured plaintiff,
its inclination to return a compromise verdict,80 or simply the com-
bination of unique trial conditions:
[t]he selection of the judge and jury, the choice of counsel, the availability of
witnesses, the manner of presentation of their testimony, the dynamics of the
rapport between witnesses and fact-finder, and the personalities and appear-
ances of the parties as they impress the fact-finder in various ways, are all
matters that defy scientific analysis, are affected by fortuitous circumstances
and variously determine the outcome of a contest .... 81
Because none of these influences touches the merits of a case, an
outcome that is attributable to them should not bind the losing
party in a later suit in which these same conditions would not be
present.
Finally, a party to litigation may subordinate his search for
truth to strategic or tactical considerations. He may limit the re-
sources committed to a particular case because of its relative insig-
nificance and difficulty in preparation.2 He may decide to forego
an appeal even though he lost on the liability issue because of the
favorable amount of the damage award.83 He may have litigated in
an unfavorable forum not of his choosing." Without the mutuality
requirement, these tactical measures affect not only the instant
suit, but subsequent actions as well. Both attorney and client oper-
ate at a disadvantage in making their litigation decisions since they
must consider not only the circumstances of the instant case, but
also the effect their decisions may have on potential-perhaps
unforeseeable-suits.
E. Exceptions to Mutuality
Several classes of well-established exceptions 5 moderate the
harsh results that universal application of mutuality sometimes
would produce. 86 Courts do not require mutuality when some rela-
80. See, e.g., Leipert v. Honold, 39 Cal. 2d 462, 247 P.2d 324 (1952).
81. Spettigue v. Mahoney, 8 Ariz. App. 281, 286, 445 P.2d 557, 562 (1968).
82. See Moore & Currier, supra note 73, at 309.
83. See Greenebaum, supra note 10, at 3.
84. See, e.g., Fink v. Coates, 323 F. Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
85. See, e.g., E. CoKE, supra note 42, at 352a-b.
86. For example, if an indemnitee, although not a party to the first action between a
third party and the indemnitor, were not able to invoke the preclusive effect of the prior
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tionship between parties to the initial and later suits forms the ba-
sis for estoppelP7 or when the ostensible nonparty had an interest
in or took control of the first action.88 Furthermore, courts will-
ingly have manipulated the concept of privity in an effort to cir-
cumvent the requirement of strict identity of parties. The first
class of exceptions is the most obvious intuitively. When a rela-
tionship between parties imposes derivative liability on one party
for the actions of the other, the exoneration of the one will estop
the common plaintiff in a second action against the other. This
exception applies "where the relation between the defendants in
the two suits has been that of principal and agent, master and ser-
vant, or indemnitor and indemnitee."90 Other applications include
insurer and insured, 1 lessor and lessee,92 and automobile owner
and driver.93 When the first suit is against the party primarily lia-
ble and he is exonerated, the injustice, not to mention the concep-
tual difficulty, of imposing derivative liability on him without the
existence of primary liability, justifies the exception. 4 When the
first action is against the party secondarily liable, the estoppel
stems from the reluctance to subject the primary actor to inconsis-
tent liabilities.9 5
Thus, in Brobston v. Burgess" plaintiff sued one of the politi-
cal subdivisions of the City of Philadelphia for injuries he received
when the automobile he was driving hit a streetcar track and the
impact wrenched the steering wheel from his hands. Plaintiff al-
leged that the city had allowed the paving along the tracks to fall
into disrepair. In a prior suit against the transit company, which
had primary responsibility for maintaining the tracks and adjoin-
unsuccessful attempt to recover against the indemnitor, then a subsequent judgment against
the indemnitee would create a dilemma: either the indemnitee would be denied his right to
indemnity or the indemnitor would lose the benefit of the favorable outcome in the first
suit. See Brobston v. Burgess, 290 Pa. 331, 138 A. 849 (1927).
87. See infra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
90. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 128 (1912).
91. See McCourt v. Algiers, 4 Wis. 2d 607, 91 N.W.2d 194 (1958).
92. See Portland Gold Mining Co. v. Stratton's Independence, Ltd., 158 F. 63 (8th Cir.
1907).
93. Good Health Dairy Prod. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 758 (1937).
94. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 128 (1912).
95. This second branch of the exception has not received universal acceptance. See
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 96(2) comment j (1942). In recent years, however, courts have
applied the exception more frequently. See, e.g., Davis v. Perryman, 225 Ark. 963, 286
S.W.2d 844 (1956).
96. 290 Pa. 331, 138 A. 849 (1927).
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ing street, a jury had failed to find that defendant was negligent in
keeping the street in good repair. In the second trial, the court dis-
missed the action against the municipality based on the collateral
estoppel effect of the facts proved in the first trial, and the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court affirmed. 7 Although the supreme court
acknowledged a lack of mutuality between the parties, it justified
the estoppel "by the injustice that would result in allowing a recov-
ery against a defendant for conduct of another, when that other
has been exonerated in a direct action." 8
When a nonparty actively assumes control of a lawsuit, an ad-
verse result precludes him from bringing a later action." He may
benefit from an outcome favorable to the party he controlled ' °0 un-
less his participation in the suit was unknown to the opposing
party. Likewise, the result of a suit will bind (and may benefit) an
individual with sufficient interest in its outcome, irrespective of
whether he is a named party.101 Thus, the court in Thompson v.
Lassiter0 2 dismissed an action for property damage to plaintiff's
automobile, which plaintiff's minor son was driving when he had
an accident with the vehicles of defendant and a third party. The
North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal,
based on the collateral estoppel effect of a prior finding that the
son was contributorily negligent. The court reasoned that in the
first suit between the other two drivers, in which one of them insti-
tuted a cross-claim against the son, the father
took every action he could have taken if he had been a defendant himself.
Furthermore, in his capacity as guardian ad litem for his son, in defending
the cross-action he exercised complete control of his son's defense including
the right of appeal. In doing so, he necessarily was defending the cross-action
as much for his own protection as for that of his son.
103
The result of a suit also will bind or benefit an unnamed "real
party in interest" in a subsequent action. If a real party in interest
in one suit becomes a named party in another proceeding against
an opposing party, collateral estoppel will bind or benefit him as if
97. Id. at 341, 138 A. at 852.
98. Id. at 338, 138 A. at 851.
99. Souffront v. La Compagnie des Sucreries, 217 U.S. 475 (1910).
100. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp. v. Williams, 70 F.2d 65 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 293 U.S. 617 (1934).
101. King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. 348, 357, 200 S.E.2d 799, 806 (1973).
102. 246 N.C. 34, 97 S.E.2d 492 (1957).
103. Id. at 39-40, 97 S.E.2d at 497 (citations omitted). But cf. Kleibor v. Rogers, 265




he were a named party in both suits. In King v. Grindstaf'04 the
administrator of the estates of a father and son brought a wrongful
death action against the owner and driver of a truck that had been
in an accident which resulted in the deaths of both father and son.
Prior to that suit, the mother and daughter, sole beneficiaries of
the two estates, had recovered against the same parties for per-
sonal injuries suffered in the collision. The second court precluded
relitigation of liability and the state supreme court affirmed, noting
that "the courts will look beyond the nominal party whose name
appears on the record as plaintiff and consider the legal questions
raised as they may affect the real party or parties in interest.'
1 05 It
concluded that the real parties in interest to the wrongful death
action in the second suit were the beneficiaries of the estate, not its
administrator.""6
Courts often manipulate the notion of privity to permit non-
parties to preclude relitigation of issues that earlier lawsuits have
determined. Although technically not an exception to mutuality,
the privity concept assumes wondrous attributes of flexibility as
courts attempt to apply their subjective sense of fairness to situa-
tions that do not fit neatly within the traditional requirements for
preclusion. Originally, application of the privity concept called
for a factual inquiry into whether "mutual or successive relation-
ship[s] to the same rights of property" s08 existed between a party
and a nonparty. In its present usage, however, the concept "does
not state a reason for either including or excluding a person from
the binding effect of a prior judgment, but rather it represents a
legal conclusion that the relationship . . . is sufficiently close to
afford" preclusion. 09 Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew'" provides
104. 284 N.C. 348, 200 S.E.2d 799 (1973).
105. Id. at 357, 200 S.E.2d at 806.
106. Id. at 358, 200 S.E.2d at 806.
107. See, e.g., Makariw v. Rinard, 222 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
108. S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 523, at 656 (16th ed. 1899).
See also 1B J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.41111], at 1255 (2d ed. 1982).
109. Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Parties, 50 IowA L. REV. 27, 45
(1964). The Restatement of Judgments has recognized this shift in meaning:
Privity is a word which expresses the idea that as to certain matters and in certain
circumstances persons who are not parties to an action but who are connected with it
in their interests are affected by the judgment with reference to interests involved in
the action, as if they were parties .... The statement that a person is bound by or
has the benefit of a judgment as a privy is a short method of stating that under the
circumstances and for the purpose of the case at hand he is bound by and entitled to
the benefits of all or some of the rules of res judicata by way of merger, bar or collateral
estoppel.
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 83 comment a (1942).
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an example of this recent attitude. In Aerojet plaintiff successfully
brought suit to obtain specific performance on a contract to
purchase certain lands from the State of Florida. Dade County,
Florida, then sued to purchase the property under the provisions
of a state statute that would give it a prior right to purchase state-
owned land. In an action to quiet title the court held that the re-
suit in the first suit precluded the county's invocation of its statu-
tory right. The court found that because the state and county rep-
resented the same interests-that is, "people in Florida living in
Dade County"""-the county "was sufficiently in privity with the
[agency] such that its claims here are susceptible" to collateral
estoppel.
11 2
III. THE ELIMINATION OF MUTUALITY
A. Development of the Doctrine
Commentators long have recognized the difference between
the binding effect and the beneficial effect of a judgment on a
stranger to an action.113 In the first instance due process considera-
tions prevent preclusion of the stranger without allowing him his
day in court. The stranger may invoke the benefits of a prior judg-
110. 366 F. Supp. 901 (N.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd, 511 F.2d 710 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 908, reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 1026 (1975).
111. Id. at 910.
112. Id. at 911. One commentator has noted that this result is "unsupported by any
recognized version of [the privity] concept." F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 23, § 11.31,
at 599.
113. See J. BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 WORKS OF JEREMY BEN-
THAM (Bowring ed. 1843); Comment, Privity and Mutuality in the Doctrine of Res Judi-
cata, 35 YALE L.J. 607, 611 (1926). Authorities have quoted extensively Bentham's evalua-
tion of the mutuality doctrine:
Another curious rule is, that, as a judgment is not evidence against a stranger, the
contrary judgment shall not be evidence for him. If the rule itself is a curious one, the
reason given for it is still more so:--"Nobody can take benefit by a verdict, who had
not been prejudiced by it, had it gone contrary:" a maxim which one would suppose to
have found its way from the gaming-table to the bench. If a party be benefited by one
throw of the dice, he will, if the rules of fair play are observed, be prejudiced by an-
other: but that the consequence should hold when applied to justice, is not equally
clear. This rule of mutuality is destitute of even that semblance of reason, which there
is for the rule concerning res inter alios acta. There is reason for saying that a man
shall not lose his cause in consequence of the verdict given in a former proceeding to
which he was not a party; but there is no reason whatever for saying that he shall not
lose his cause in consequence of the verdict in a proceeding to which he was a party,
merely because his adversary was not. It is right enough that a verdict obtained by A
against B should not bar the claim of a third party C; but that it should not be evi-
dence in favour of C against B, seems the very height of absurdity.
J. BENTHAM, supra at 171 (emphasis in original).
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ment to preclude a party to the action from relitigating it without
creating a due process problem, however, since the common party
already has had a chance to litigate the issue.114 Although com-
mentators often had noted the lack of a rational connection-other
than an unjustified deference to symmetry-between the two situ-
ations,115 Judge Traynor in Bernhard v. Bank of America" 6 as-
sumed the task of laying to rest "the glib and superficial require-
ment of mutuality of estoppel . . by a triumph of judicial
statesmanship."' 17
In Bernhard the initial suit arose as a dispute between the ad-
ministrator and the beneficiaries of the will of Clara Sather over a
certain account. Before her death Mrs. Sather had authorized
Charles Cook to handle part of her business affairs. She had with-
drawn some $4,000 from her savings account and directed Cook to
deposit it in another account that he had opened without her au-
thorization in the name of "Clara Sather by Charles 0. Cook."
Cook later withdrew the money from this account and put it to his
own use. On Mrs. Sather's death Cook qualified as executor of her
estate and eventually filed an account that made no mention of
this money. The beneficiaries, including Bernhard, filed objections
to the account for this reason, but the probate court found that
Mrs. Sather had made Cook an inter vivos gift of the money. After
Cook's resignation Bernhard became administratrix and filed a sec-
ond suit against the bank alleging that Mrs. Sather never had au-
thorized withdrawal of the funds. The trial court held that the pro-
bate court's findings precluded Bernhard from denying Cook's
ownership of the money, and the California Supreme Court
affirmed.
Although earlier opinions had criticized the mutuality require-
ment when a nonparty attempted to invoke the result of a prior
action,11 8 Bernhard was the first case that rejected specifically the
requirement 1 9 without either relying on an alternate holding 20 or
114. See Bernhard v. Bank of Am., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 812, 122 P.2d 892, 894 (1942).
115. See, e.g., J. BENTHAM, supra note 113, at 171.
116. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
117. Currie, supra note 21, at 285.
118. See, e.g., Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 A. 260 (1934); Taylor
v. Sartorious, 130 Mo. App. 23, 108 S.W. 1089 (1908).
119. Bernhard v. Bank of Am., 19 Cal. 2d at 812-13, 122 P.2d at 895 ("No satisfactory
rationalization has been advanced for the requirement of mutuality .... In the present
case, therefore, .. . lack of privity or of mutuality of estoppel" does not prevent the defen-
dant from alleging preclusion.).
120. See, e.g., Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 133, 172 A. 260, 263-64
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bringing the case within one of the traditional exceptions to mutu-
ality.121 Judge Traynor applied a three-part test for determining
when preclusion is appropriate: "Was the issue decided in the prior
adjudication identical with, the one presented in the action in ques-
tion? Was there a final judgment on the merits? Was the party
against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party
to the prior adjudication?
1 22
Other courts, led by the New York courts, began to follow the
Bernhard doctrine. In Israel v. Wood Dolson Co.' 23 plaintiff lost a
breach of contract issue against one party, and the court precluded
plaintiff's recovery against another party for inducing the first
party to breach the contract. The court reasoned that
[w]here a full opportunity has been afforded to a party to the prior action
and he has failed to prove his freedom from liability or to establish liability
or culpability on the part of another, there is no reason for permitting him to
retry th[o]se issues.
[T]he fact that a party has not had his day in court on an issue as
against a particular litigant is not decisive .... 124
The court stressed that it was not adding "another general class of
cases to the list of 'exceptions'" to mutuality, but rather was artic-
ulating an "underlying principle"-a previous full opportunity to
litigate by the precluded party-that rendered a mutuality re-
quirement unnecessary. 125 In McCourt v. Algiers 26 Wisconsin fol-
lowed California and New York in rejecting the mutuality require-
ment when "countervailing reasons are present. . .[such as a] full
opportunity to litigate" the issue previously in a voluntarily chosen
forum. 27 The federal courts of appeal began to abandon mutuality
during the 1950's."12 The Supreme Court, however, did not address
the issue until 1971.129
(1934) (faulty reply to demurrer).
121. See, e.g., Taylor v. Sartorious, 130 Mo. App. 23, 40-41, 108 S.W. 1089, 1094 (1908)
(indemnitor-indemnitee exception); Good Health Dairy Prod. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14,
17-18, 9 N.E.2d 758, 759 (1937) (master-servant exception).
122. Bernhard v. Bank of Am., 19 Cal. 2d at 813, 122 P.2d at 895.
123. 1 N.Y. 2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956).
124. Id. at 119, 134 N.E.2d at 99, 151 N.Y.S.2d at 4 (emphasis in original).
125. Id. at 120, 134 N.E.2d at 99, 151 N.Y.S.2d at 5.
126. 4 Wis. 2d 607, 91 N.W.2d 194 (1958).
127. Id. at 612, 91 N.W.2d at 197.
128. The Third Circuit was the first court of appeals to abandon mutuality in Brus-
zewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir. 1950) (Hastie, J.). In the same year the
Second Circuit followed with Adriaanse v. United States, 184 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1950) (A.
Hand, J.). See Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964).
129. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc., v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
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B. The Supreme Court Cases
The Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.
University of Illinois Foundation3 0 joined the growing number of
jurisdictions" 1 that had abandoned the mutuality requirement in
situations in which a defendant attempted to preclude an issue
that the plaintiff already had litigated and lost against another
party.13 2 Blonder-Tongue concerned an infringement claim against
a patent that a court had declared invalid in an earlier action
against another party. Citing the burden on judicial administration
and the misallocation of resources that would result from relitiga-
tion of a decided issue,133 the Court followed Bernhard and re-
jected a flat mutuality requirement.' The Court held, however,
that an earlier judgment would not preclude a losing party from
relitigating an issue if he could demonstrate that the first action
failed to allow him a "fair opportunity procedurally, substantively,
and evidentially to pursue his claim ...."135
Although Blonder-Tongue concerned a defensive assertion of
preclusion,s eight years later in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore
13 7
the Supreme Court extended its rejection of mutuality to offensive
uses. In Parklane, which was a stockholders' derivative action,
plaintiffs asserted the preclusive effect of a prior finding in a Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) suit against Parklane
that a proxy statement which the company issued was materially
false and misleading. The Court permitted offensive use of collat-
eral estoppel, but noted two differences from the doctrine's defen-
sive application. Unlike defensive collateral estoppel, offensive use
130. Id.
131. By 1971 these jurisdictions included Alaska, California, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Wisconsin. See supra
cases cited note 8.
132. This attempt at preclusion by the defendant is known as defensive use of collat-
eral estoppel. Offensive use of the doctrine occurs when a plaintiff seeks to prove part of his
case by precluding an issue that the defendant already has litigated and lost. Fewer jurisdic-
tions permit offensive use without mutuality than permit defensive use, but the United
States Supreme Court has approved its application subject to the trial judge's discretion.
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). See infra notes 137-44 and accompany-
ing text. For a discussion of the difference between applying collateral estoppel in defensive
and offensive situations, see Callen & Kadue, supra note 17; Note, supra note 10.
133. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. at 328-29.
134. Id. at 349-50.
135. Id. at 333 (quoting Eisel v. Columbia Packing Co., 181 F. Supp. 298, 301 (D.
Mass. 1960)).
136. 402 U.S. at 329-30.
137. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
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does not necessarily promote judicial economy, since it may en-
courage plaintiffs to forego joinder to benefit from a favorable out-
come but not be precluded by an adverse one.138 In addition use of
offensive collateral estoppel may be unfair to the defendant if he
chose not to devote substantial resources to his defense in the first
action. 13' Despite these potential problem areas, the Court decided
not to forbid all use of offensive collateral estoppel, but to give
trial judges "broad discretion to determine when it should be ap-
plied."140 In dicta the Court listed four instances in which offensive
collateral estoppel might be unfair to a defendant. First, the Court
noted that when the alleged damages in the first lawsuit are signifi-
cantly less than the damages sought in the second action, the de-
fendant may have had little incentive to defend the first suit vigor-
ously.141 Second, the Court recognized the possibility of creating
Professor Currie's multiple claimant anomaly.14 2 Third, it warned
that procedural differences between the two suits, such as an in-
convenient forum in the first action, might make offensive use in-
appropriate.4 s Last, the Court noted that "other reasons," includ-
ing the ease with which the plaintiff could have joined in the initial




A. The Policy Arguments
Critics of the Bernhard doctrine advance three policy argu-
ments as rationales for keeping the mutuality requirement.1'5 First,
they claim that considerations of fairness to the parties underlie
the requirement.1 4 6 Second, they contend that mutuality stems
from the nature of an in personam judgment."14 Last, they point to
the fallibility of the litigation process.148
If by the first argument critics intend to identify fairness
strictly with symmetry of estoppel, then Jeremy Bentham's gam-
138. Id. at 329-30; see infra text at note 165.
139. 439 U.S. at 330-31; see infra text at notes 141-44.
140. 439 U.S. at 331 (footnote omitted).
141. Id. at 330.
142. Id. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
143. 439 U.S. at 331 & n.15.
144. Id. at 331.
145. See supra notes 68-84 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
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ing-table analogy14" serves as sufficient refutation. A bald appeal to
symmetry for its own sake is an inadequate justification for mutu-
ality. If, on the other hand, mutuality proponents contend that
elimination of the requirement unfairly subjects the bound party
to a disproportionately greater risk of liability, then the argument
deserves more careful consideration. Of course, the problem arises
only in a small fraction of nonmutual collateral estoppel cases,
since it applies only to situations of offensive assertion.150 In these
cases, setting aside theory for a moment, the first trial has consid-
erable practical effect on subsequent litigation. It acts as a test
case51 1 and likely will affect both settlement discussions and trial
strategy in future actions irrespective of mutuality considerations.
The outcome, however, should prejudice unfairly the bound defen-
dant, whatever his risk, only if the first trial reaches a "wrong"
result in some manner that the defendant cannot articulate to the
subsequent court. If the initial result is correct, then the risk of
disproportionately great liability is not a problem in subsequent
suits. The defendant would incur the same liability from several
separate suits that reach the same "correct" result. Since unfair-
ness occurs only when the initial outcome is "incorrect," the Su-
preme Court has given trial courts broad discretion not to apply
preclusion. Courts willingly have exercised this discretion 5 2 when
they have found it appropriate. Of course, a bound litigant may
fail to meet his burden of showing prejudice in the earlier suit. A
miscarriage of justice of this kind always is possible since the judi-
cial system necessarily has imperfections. These defects, however,
do not arise solely in nonmutuality cases, but are just as likely to
occur in cases in which the litigants are identical to parties in a
later suit. The proferred remedy-the mutuality requirement-
provides no means of distinguishing correctly decided cases from
erroneously decided ones. The mutuality requirement arbitrarily
withholds preclusive effect for reasons unrelated to the source of
the problem. A better method would be either to correct the insti-
tutional deficiencies that allowed the initial error or to accept an
149. See supra note 113.
150. See supra note 132.
151. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster, 350 F. Supp. 757, 767 (S.D. Ohio 1972) ("It
was obvious that plaintiff's counsel ... was litigating his most favorable case in an attempt
to test the liability and monetary responsibility of [defendant]."), rev'd, on other grounds
sub nom. Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1973).




The second argument for preserving the mutuality require-
ment relies upon the inherent nature of an in personam judgment
and is irrelevant for two reasons. First, the appropriate inquiry is
whether the result of preclusion-providing only "one full and fair
opportunity for judicial resolution of the same issue" 154-unduly
burdens the common party who may not relitigate, not whether, in
some abstract sense, it violates in personam principles that cate-
gorically limit the extension of a judgment.1 55 More importantly,
however, reliance on the in personam character of a judgment to
critique collateral estoppel confuses the nature of estoppel with
that of res judicata. 56 The preclusive effect of estoppel in this situ-
ation proceeds not from the judgment, which binds only parties to
it, but from the facts themselves, which derived from the affirma-
tive acts of the parties. The facts established in the initial suit pre-
cluded the bound party in the second suit from taking a particular
position or cooperating in a particular result that contradicted the
earlier determinations.157 Collateral estoppel per se does not im-
pose liability; it "only tends to narrow the area of conflict in the
second action"1 58 by precluding the denial of facts already estab-
lished.15' Although legal relationships as the judgment defines
them may change-or may be limited appropriately by in per-
sonam principles-the underlying facts have a more obdurate exis-
tence. In the absence of evidence that the earlier litigation pro-
vided less than a full and fair opportunity for discovery of these
facts, little reason exists not to accord them continued validity in
subsequent suits.
Public policy demands an end to litigation, both to give cer-
tainty and predictability to human affairs and to settle private dis-
putes."1 0 At the same time, because any legal system necessarily
contains a potential for error, courts and scholars must balance the
possibility of an incorrect determination in a particular case
against the general goal of precluding relitigation. Opponents of
the Bernhard doctrine contend that the mutuality requirement
153. See Callen & Kadue, supra note 17, at 764.
154. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of 111. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328 (1971).
155. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text; Moore & Currier, supra note 73,
at 301-02.
156. See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 25-51 and accompanying text.
158. Polasky, supra note 20, at 220.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31 & 49.
160. See, e.g., Polasky, supra note 20, at 219-22.
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strikes this balance appropriately by limiting reliance on a possibly
deficient or erroneous result.""1 The fallacy of this argument is ob-
vious, for the same rationale would limit preclusion when mutual-
ity exists. Requiring mutuality, without more, does not increase
the reliability of a former adjudication. The imperfection in the
prior litigation is completely independent of the identity of the
parties in the later suit. Certain types of situations6 2 do contain a
greater possibility for unfairness if the court allows preclusion, but
because not every instance realizes this potential, denial of estop-
pel to the entire class of nonmutual cases is too broad a remedy.
16 3
The preferred approach is to require articulation of the spe-
cific reason why preclusion is inappropriate under the particular
circumstances. For instance, in cases of offensive use of collateral
estoppel'" the disincentive for joinder potentially is unfair to the
common defendant and burdensome on the court system since it
promotes multiple suits based only on tactical considerations. The
United States Supreme Court has noted that
[s]ince a plaintiff will be able to rely on a previous judgment against a defen-
dant but will not be bound by that judgment if the defendant wins, the plain-
tiff has every incentive to adopt a "wait and see" attitude, in the hope that
the first action by another plaintiff will result in a favorable judgment. Thus
offensive use of collateral estoppel will likely increase rather than decrease
the total amount of litigation, since potential plaintiffs will have everything
to gain and nothing to lose by not intervening in the first action.'15
In giving trial courts wide discretion to permit or deny preclusion
by nonparties, the Supreme Court stressed that the ease with
which a subsequent plaintiff could have joined a prior action, and
the degree to which preclusion would reward a plaintiff for his de-
161. Greenebaum, supra note 10, at 2.
162. For a description of circumstances in which preclusion may be unfair, see supra
text accompanying notes 141-44.
163. Rejecting the argument that the possibility of an erroneous determination should
limit the preclusive effect of a prior decision, one court reasoned that
the very notion of collateral estoppel demands and assumes a certain confidence in the
integrity of the end result of our adjudicative process. There is no foundation in either
experience or policy for accepting the suggestion that a decision rendered after a full
and fair presentation of the evidence and issues should be considered either substan-
tially suspect or infected with variables indicating the question might be decided differ-
ently in another go-around.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Century Home Components, Inc., 275 Or. 97, 106-07, 550 P.2d
1185, 1190 (1976).
164. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.




lay, are relevant factors in the court's determination.'66
In litigation with multiple claimants, although the potential
for inconsistent verdicts always exists, the proper procedure is to
wait until the possibility becomes an actuality 67 before inquiring
into the surrounding circumstances. In fact, courts in jurisdictions
that permit offensive use of nonmutual preclusion have been reluc-
tant to give prior inconsistent verdicts preclusive effect. 1' For ex-
ample, in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Century Home Com-
ponents, Inc., " 9 the fourth in a series of related suits that arose
out of losses incurred in a fire, plaintiff attempted to preclude the
common defendant from relitigating the issue of its liability, which
two of the three previous actions had established. The court at
first refused to deny preclusion based on a "hypothetical possibil-
ity" of error, but it noted that
we are not free to disregard incongruous results when they are looking us in
the eye. If the circumstances are such that our confidence in the integrity of
the determination is severely undermined, or that the result would likely be
different in a second trial, it would work an injustice to deny the litigant
another chance.
170
Refusing to decide which of the inconsistent results was better, the
court declined to apply collateral estoppel.1
7
1
Courts have been willing to scrutinize closely the factual set-
tings of multiple claimant cases for factors that limited full litiga-
tion in the initial suit. 7 2 In Berner v. British Commonwealth Pa-
cific Airlines7 3 the court examined the tactical motivations of the
defendant airline in prior litigation to determine whether to deny
the result preclusive effect. The airline had won its initial suit, but
166. Id. at 331.
167. Evidence indicates that the wait may be a relatively long one. "[I]nconsistent
verdicts are rarely encountered. Our research has disclosed only one case where inconsistent
determinations by separate trial courts were asserted as a reason for denying collateral es-
toppel." State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Century Home Components, Inc., 275 Or. 97, 109,
550 P.2d 1185, 1191 (1976).
168. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Century Home Components, Inc., 275 Or.
97, 550 P.2d 1185 (1976) (inconsistency in results of three trials prevents preclusive effect in
13 other cases).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 108, 550 P.2d at 1190.
171. Id. at 114, 550 P.2d at 1194.
172. Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965) (pre-
clusion denied because no incentive to fully litigate first suit), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983
(1966); United States v. United Air Lines, 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash. 1962) (preclusion
allowed because first suit resolved 24 of 31 total claims), aff'd sub nom. United Air Lines, v.
Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
173. 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966).
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the Second Circuit reversed on appeal. On retrial the jury found
the airline liable but returned a damage award of $35,000 instead
of the $500,000 for which plaintiff had prayed. The court reasoned
that the discrepancy between the two amounts was so great that
defendant would have considered the result a victory and accepted
it rather than incur the risk and expense of an appeal and possible
retrial.1"' Thus, the court held that failure to appeal a $35,000
judgment should not preclude the airline from relitigating its lia-
bility in a subsequent suit for $7 million.17 5
In United States v. United Air Lines,176 however, the court
permitted preclusion, but only after considering a list of factors
that could have changed the outcome had one of them been pre-
sent. It pointed out that in the original fifteen-week trial, during
which the court consolidated twenty-four cases, the parties had lit-
igated the issues exhaustively, having engaged in "exceedingly ex-
tensive" discovery. 7 7 Furthermore, the court noted that defendant
had admitted that it would offer no "new, different, or additional
evidence" in the nine cases remaining for trial.7 8 Concluding that
"[ilt would be a travesty upon [the concept of justice] to now re-
quire these plaintiffs... to again re-litigate the issue of liability
after it has been so thoroughly and consummately litigated
... ,,17 the court allowed nonmutual estoppel "in the interest of
justice."'8
o
B. Continuity of Results
In a sense, opponents of the Bernhard doctrine have placed
themselves in a dilemma. On the one hand, they have argued that
the doctrine will create injustice and will extend the scope of col-
lateral estoppel beyond its proper bounds. 18' On the other hand,
commentators have made a considerable effort to bring those cases
that have eliminated the mutuality requirement within a tradi-
tional exception to mutuality.'82 Bernhard, for example, "fall[s]
174. Id. at 540-41.
175. Id.
176. 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash. 1962), aff'd sub noma. United Air Lines v. Weiner,
335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
177. 216 F. Supp. at 712.
178. Id. at 728.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 729.
181. See, e.g., Moore & Currier, supra note 73.
182. See Greenebaum, supra note 10; Moore & Currier, supra note 73; Overton, supra
note 10; Note, supra note 10.
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easily within the 'related non-common parties'" exception; '
Blonder-Tongue is "based on substantive nonjudgments law rather
than collateral estoppel;"' 84 and Israel v. Wood Dolson Co.' 85 con-
cerns a "vendor-vendee relationship . . . [that] might well be re-
garded as a sufficient legal relationship to bring ... [it] within the
broad general exception to the mutuality requirement."' 86 These
attempts by commentators to present the decisions in such a light
that one would conclude readily that the "supposed trend away
from mutuality is probably more apparent than real,'18 7 coupled
with a parallel trend among courts to expand greatly the privity
rationale, 88 undercut the contention that abandoning mutuality is
a radical departure from accepted practice.
This second trend-the expansion of the notion of privity as a
rationale for preclusion-has become an increasingly popular
method by which courts may give lip service to the notion of mutu-
ality, yet allow estoppel in those cases in which relitigation would
have little utility and the bound party has exercised fully his due
process right to a full opportunity to contest the issue. For exam-
ple, in Waitkus v. Pomeroy 89 two passengers in an automobile
that collided with another vehicle brought separate suits for per-
sonal injuries against the drivers of both autos. In the initial suit
the first passenger recovered against one driver, but the court
found the other driver nonnegligent. The second driver pled this
result as estoppel in the later suit that the other passenger brought
against him. The Colorado Court of Appeals precluded relitigation
of the second driver's negligence, finding that the two passengers
were in privity.190
Commentators have noted that in certain circumstances courts
willingly invoke the notion of privity as a justification for permit-
183. Greenebaum, supra note 10, at 18 n.69.
184. Overton, supra note 10, at 941 (holder of patent must choose at his peril which
infringer to sue first).
185. 1 N.Y.2d 116, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1, 134 N.E.2d 97 (1956).
186. Moore & Currier, supra note 73, at 320.
187. Greenebaum, supra note 10, at 1.
188. See, e.g., Note, Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1485, 1494
n.66 (1974); supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
189. 31 Colo. App. 396, 506 P.2d 392 (1972), reo'd on other grounds, 183 Colo. 344, 517
P.2d 396 (1973).
190. 31 Colo. App. at 405-06, 506 P.2d at 397-98. A United States district court in
Florida reached a similar result in Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Askew, 366 F. Supp. 901 (N. D. Fla.




ting collateral estoppel out of fairness to the parties.191 Although
the results of these equitable judicial actions may be commenda-
ble, the ad hoc approach that courts have taken converts the priv-
ity requirement into a vague concept of such amorphous dimen-
sions that it has no utility in predicting when preclusion will apply.
Allowing nonmutual collateral estoppel-altering little the out-
come of judicial efforts to reconcile procedural form with substan-
tive justice-will serve this goal better, and, at the same time, will
provide more definite and reliable guidelines for determining the
circumstances in which courts will, or will not, permit a plea of
collateral estoppel.
C. Shifting the Burden of Persuasion
The practical effect of the Bernhard doctrine on the applica-
tion of collateral estoppel is to shift the burden of justifying an
exception to the rule in a nonmutual preclusion situation. With the
mutuality requirement, the party asserting preclusion must dem-
onstrate that one of the traditional exceptions is applicable, or that
the nonparty's relationship to the original party is sufficiently close
to bring him within the notion of privity. The risk of nonpersua-
sion, therefore, falls on the party seeking to end litigation and con-
serve the resources of the court. In this situation the standard for
applying collateral estoppel-whether the relation between the
stranger and a party to the initial action is sufficiently close-is
irrelevant to the substantive merits of the issue for which the party
is seeking preclusion. That is, the test gives no indication whether
the original determination of the issue was correct. Thus, a neces-
sarily mechanical application of the mutuality standard in a pen-
umbral case increases the burden on litigants and the court system
without concomitantly increasing the reliability of the result.
Under the Bernhard doctrine, however, the burden is on the
party against whom the preclusion would operate to show that he
did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue previ-
ously.192 In this case the risk of nonpersuasion falls on the party
seeking to relitigate to show specifically why he should receive an-
191. See F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, supra note 23, at 599; M. GREENE, BASIC CIVW PROCE-
DURE 214 (1972); Vestal, supra note 109, at 45; Note, supra note 188, at 1494 n.66. For
example, Professor Greene notes that "the course which most courts pursued [has been to
make] ad hoc exceptions [to mutuality] where fairness seemed to demand it." M. GREENE,
supra, at 216.
192. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Century Home Components, Inc., 275 Or. 97,
105, 550 P.2d 1185, 1189 (1976).
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other opportunity to obtain a more favorable result. Here, the
standard for preclusion-whether the common party had a full op-
portunity to litigate in the previous suit-provides a much closer
connection to the issue itself. Thus, if the precluded party cannot
show an inadequate opportunity to litigate, the prior litigation
probably reached an appropriate determination of the issue.193
Therefore, shifting the burden of proving exceptional circum-
stances not only better achieves the policy goals of collateral estop-
pel, but also serves as a check on the accuracy of the issue's deter-
mination in the initial litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
The modern trend in American procedural jurisprudence has
been away from a formalistic, gamesmanship approach to the liti-
gation process and toward a system based upon principles of fair-
ness and efficiency in resolving conflicts without unjustifiable ex-
pense and delay. No system of procedural rules alone, however, can
guarantee in every case a result that corresponds with absolute
truth or fundamental concepts of justice. Any system that is suffi-
ciently sophisticated to deal adequately with the complexity and
variety of modern American legal relationships is necessarily in-
complete since the proper procedural method of handling all possi-
ble factual situations is impossible to anticipate. Thus, a rule of
decision that receives universal application sometimes will waste
resources and produce substantive injustice.
The facts of a particular case provide substance to the proce-
dural rules applied to that case, and thus give life to the legal sys-
tem. The facts supply the rationale for choosing one principle over
another. A court must have the flexibility to apply a rule of deci-
sion, or not, according to whether it will accomplish, or is consis-
tent with, the underlying policy goals as the facts of that particular
case define them. Although an unjust result still theoretically is
possible, the courts' flexibility in choosing not to apply a principle
193. An "appropriate" determination does not necessarily imply that the result is ab-
solutely correct, but rather that no reason appears for doubting it.
[T]he unsubstantiated and conjectural possibility that a party might receive a
favorable judgment somewhere down the road is an insufficient reason for refusing to
apply collateral estoppel. . . . "[T]he prior judgment is treated as conclusive, not be-
cause it is actually conclusive evidence of the ultimate truth as to those issues necessa-
rily determined, but because of the public interest in the finality of judgments and in
the efficient administration of justice."




if the facts present an actual danger of injustice will enhance pub-
lic confidence in the result and in the legal system as a whole.
The traditional mutuality requirement is an absolute principle
that inflexibly denies preclusion unless the parties meet certain
technical requirements that are unrelated to the merits of the suit.
The Bernhard doctrine, on the other hand, gives appropriate em-
phasis to the facts presented in a legal dispute. Rooted firmly in
the common-law tradition, the doctrine provides a general finality
principle that is adaptable to exceptional cases in which relitiga-
tion is appropriate. Over the past forty years courts have demon-
strated a consistent willingness and capability to administer the
Bernhard standard without disadvantaging either party to the law-
suit. The net effect of the Bernhard doctrine-shifting the burden
of persuading a court that preclusion is appropriate-better re-
flects the underlying policy rationales of collateral estoppel while
also providing some review of the prior determination. Allowing
courts to deny preclusion when a party articulates an actual reason
to suspect the previous litigation result, but permit it when the
earlier action fully explored and determined the issue in question,
better conserves legal resources, engenders public confidence in ju-
dicial dispute resolution, and provides the parties with a full and
adequate forum to vindicate those legal rights that the proven
facts have shown to exist.
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